A practitioner's guide to intergovernmental fiscal transfers by Shah, Anwar







Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are a dominant feature of subnational finance in most 
countries.  They are used to ensure that revenues roughly match the expenditure needs of 
various orders (levels) of subnational governments.  They are also used to advance 
national, regional and local area objectives such as fairness and equity and creating a 
common economic union. The structure of these transfers creates incentives for national, 
regional and local governments that have a bearing on fiscal management, 
macroeconomic stability, distributional equity, allocative efficiency and public services 
delivery.   This paper reviews the conceptual, empirical and practice literature to distill 
lessons of policy interest in designing the fiscal transfers to create the right incentives for 
prudent fiscal management and competitive and innovative service delivery.  The paper 
provides practical guidance on the design of performance-oriented transfers that 
emphasize bottom-up, client-focused and results-based government accountability. It 
cites examples of simple but innovative grant designs that can satisfy grantors’ objectives 
while preserving local autonomy and creating an enabling environment for responsive, 
responsible, equitable and accountable public governance. The paper further provides 
guidance on the design and practice of equalization transfers for regional fiscal equity as 
well as the institutional arrangements for implementation of such transfer mechanisms.  
The paper concludes with negative (practices to avoid) and positive (practices to emulate) 
lessons from international practices.       
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The practice of intergovernmental fiscal transfers is the magical art of passing 
money from one government to another and seeing it vanish in thin air. 
-Anonymous 
 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers finance about 60 percent of subnational expenditures in 
developing countries and transition economies and about a third of such expenditures in 
OECD countries (29 percent in the Nordic countries, 46 percent in non-Nordic Europe). 
Beyond the expenditures they finance, these transfers create incentives and accountability 
mechanisms that affect the fiscal management, efficiency, and equity of public service 
provision and government accountability to citizens.  
 
This paper reviews the principles and practices of intergovernmental finance, with a view 
to drawing some general lessons of relevance to policymakers and practitioners in 
developing countries and transition economies. It provides a taxonomy of grants, their 
possible impacts on local fiscal behavior, and the accountability of grant recipients to 
donor governments and citizens. The first section describes the instruments of 
intergovernmental finance. Section 2 discusses performance-oriented, or output-based, 
transfers, an important tool for results-based accountability. Section 3 describes the 
objectives and design of fiscal transfers in various countries around the world. It shows 
that in developing countries and transition economies, fiscal transfers focus largely on 
revenue-sharing transfers, with little attention paid to serving national objectives. It cites 
examples of simple but innovative grant designs that can satisfy grantors’ objectives 
while preserving local autonomy and creating an enabling environment for responsive, 
responsible, equitable and accountable public governance. Section 4 describes 
institutional arrangements for determining these transfers. The last section highlights 
some lessons of relevance to current policy debates in developing countries and transition 
economies. It lists practices to avoid as well as those to emulate in designing and 
implementing grant programs. 
 
1. Instruments of Intergovernmental Finance 
Intergovernmental transfers or grants can be broadly classified into two categories: 




General-purpose transfers are provided as general budget support, with no strings 
attached. These transfers are typically mandated by law, but occasionally they may be of 
an ad hoc or discretionary nature. Such transfers are intended to preserve local autonomy 
and enhance interjurisdictional equity. That is why article 9 of the European Charter of 
Local Self Government advocates such transfers by stating: “As far as possible, grants to 
local authorities shall not be earmarked for the financing of specific projects. The provision of grants shall not remove the basic freedom of local authorities to exercise 
policy discretion within their own jurisdiction.” (Barati and Szalai 2000, p.21) 
 
General-purpose transfers are termed bloc transfers when they are used to provide broad 
support in a general area of subnational expenditures (such as education) while allowing 
recipients discretion in allocating the funds among specific uses. Bloc grants are a 
vaguely defined concept. They fall in the grey area between general-purpose and 
specific-purpose transfers, as they provide budget support with no strings attached in a 
broad but specific area of subnational expenditures.  
 
General-purpose transfers simply augment the recipient’s resources. They have only an 
income effect as indicated in figure 1 by the shift in the recipient’s budget line AB 
upwards and to the right throughout by the amount of the grant (AC=BD) and the new 
budget line becomes CD. Since the grant can be spent on any combination of public 
goods or services or used to provide tax relief to residents, general nonmatching 
assistance does not affect relative prices (no substitution effect). It is also the least 
stimulative of local spending, typically increasing such spending by less than $0.50 for 
each additional $1 of unconditional assistance. The remaining funds are made available 
as tax relief to local residents to spend on private goods and services.  
 
Figure 1 Effect of Unconditional Nonmatching Grant  
 
 
Source: Shah (1994) 
 
Conceptually a one-dollar increase in local residents’ income should have exactly the 
same impact on local public spending as receipt of one dollar of general purpose transfer. 
Both tend to shift the budget line outward identically. Contrary to this, all empirical 
studies show that a dollar received by the community in the form of general purpose 
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Spending on public good A grant tends to have a greater increase in local public spending more than a dollar increase 
in residents’ income i.e. the portion of grants retained for local spending tends to exceed 
the effective tax rate imposed by local governments on resident’s incomes (Rosen 2005, 
Oates 1999, Gramlich 1977; chapter 8 of this volume). Grant money tends to stick where 
it first lands, leaving a smaller than expected fraction available for tax relief, a 
phenomenon referred to as the “flypaper effect.” The implication is that for political and 
bureaucratic reasons, grants to local governments tend to result in more local spending 
than they would have had the same transfers been made directly to local residents 
(McMillan, Shah, and Gillen 1980). An explanation for this impact is provided by the 
hypothesis that bureaucrats seeks to maximize the size of their budgets as it gives them 
greater power and influence in local community (Filimon, Romer and Rosenthal 1982). 
 
Formula-based general-purpose transfers are very common. The federal and state 
transfers to municipalities in Brazil are examples of grants of this kind. Evidence 
suggests that such transfers induce municipalities to underutilize their own tax bases 
(Shah, 1991). 
 
Specific-Purpose Transfers  
Specific-purpose, or conditional, transfers are intended to provide incentives for 
governments to undertake specific programs or activities. These grants may be regular or 
mandatory in nature or discretionary or ad hoc.  
 
Conditional transfers typically specify the type of expenditures that can be financed 
(input-based conditionality). These may be capital expenditures, operating expenditures, 
or both. Conditional transfers may also require attainment of certain results in service 
delivery (output-based conditionality). Input-based conditionality is often intrusive and 
unproductive, whereas output-based conditionality can advance grantors’ objectives 
while preserving local autonomy. 
 
Conditional transfers may incorporate matching provisions – requiring grant recipients to 
finance a specified percentage of expenditures using their own resources. Matching 
requirements can be either open ended, meaning that the grantor matches whatever level 
of resources the recipient provides, or closed ended, meaning that the grantor matches 
recipient funds only up to a pre-specified limit.  
 
Matching requirements encourage greater scrutiny and local ownership of grant-financed 
expenditures; closed-ended matching is helpful in ensuring that the grantor has some 
control over the costs of the transfer program. Matching requirements, however,   
represent a greater burden for a recipient jurisdiction with limited fiscal capacity.  In view 
of this, it may be desirable to set matching rates in inverse proportion to the per capita 
fiscal capacity of the jurisdiction in order to allow poorer jurisdictions to participate in 
grant-financed programs.  
 
Nonmatching Transfers 
Conditional nonmatching transfers provide a given level of funds without local matching, 
as long the funds are spent for a particular purpose. Following the grant (=AC), the budget line in figure 2 shifts from AB to ACD, where at least OE (=AC) of the assisted 
public good will be acquired. 
 




Source: Shah (1994) 
 
Conditional nonmatching grants are best suited for subsidizing activities considered high 
priority by a higher-level government but low priority by local governments. This may be 
the case if a program generates a high degree of spillovers up to a given level of 
provision (OE), after which the external benefits terminate abruptly.  
 
For a given level of available assistance, grant recipients prefer unconditional 
nonmatching transfers, which provide them with maximum flexibility to pursue their own 
objectives. Because such grants augment resources without influencing spending 
patterns, they allow recipients to maximize their own welfare. Grantors, however, may be 
prepared to sacrifice some recipient satisfaction to ensure that the funds are directed 
toward expenditures on which they place a priority. This is particularly so when federal 
objectives are implemented by line agencies or departments rather than through a central 
agency, such as the Ministry of Finance, with a broader mandate. Federal departments do 
not want local governments to shift their program funds toward other areas. In this 
situation, conditional (selective) nonmatching (bloc) grants can ensure that the funds are 
spent in a department’s area of interest (for example, health care) without distorting local 
priorities among alternative activities or inducing inefficient allocations in the targeted 
expenditure area.  
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Spending on assisted public 
goodsMatching Transfers 
Conditional matching grants, or cost-sharing programs, require that funds be spent for 
specific purposes and that the recipient match the funds to some degree. Figure 3 shows 
the effect on a local government budget of a 25 percent subsidy program for 
transportation. AB indicates the no subsidy line—the combination of transportation and 
other public goods and services a city can acquire with a budget of OA = OB. A federal 
subsidy of 25 percent of transportation expenditures (that is, a grant of $1 for every $3 of 
local funds for spent on transportation) shifts the budget line of attainable combinations 
to AC. At any level of other goods and services, the community can obtain one-third 
more transportation services. If the community chooses combination M before the grant, 
it will likely select a combination such as N afterward. At N more transportation is 
acquired. 
 





Source: Shah (1994) and McMillan, Shah and Gillen (1980) 
 
The subsidy has two effects, an income effect and a substitution effect. The subsidy gives 
the community more resources, some of which go to acquiring more transportation 
services (the income effect). Since the subsidy reduces the relative price of transportation 
services, the community acquires more transportation services from a given budget (the 
substitution effect). Both effects stimulate higher spending on transportation. 
 
Although the grant is for transportation, more other public goods and services may also 
be acquired, even though they become relatively more expensive, as a result of the 
substitution effect. If the income effect is sufficiently large, it will dominate and the grant 
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Spending on assisted public 
goods
A 
O  B  C will increase consumption of other goods and services. Most studies find that for grants 
of this kind, spending in the specified area increases by less than the amount of the grant, 
with the remainder going toward other public goods and services and tax relief. This is 
the so-called fungibility effect of grants. The fungibility of conditional grants depends on 
both the level of spending on the assisted public service and the relative priority of such 
spending. For example, if the recipient’s own-financed expenditure on the assisted 
category exceeds the amount of the conditional grant, the conditionality of the grant may 
or may not have any impact on the recipient’s spending behavior: all, some, or none of 
the grant funds could go to the assisted function. Shah (1985, 1988b, 1989) finds that 
while provincial assistance to cities in Alberta for public transit was partially diverted to 
finance other services, similar assistance for road transportation improvement was not.  
 
Open-ended matching grants, in which no limit is placed on available assistance through 
matching provisions, are well suited for correcting inefficiencies in the provision of 
public goods arising from benefit spillovers, or externalities. Benefit spillovers occur 
when services provided and financed by a local government also benefit members of 
other local governments that do not contribute to their provision. Because the providing 
government bears all the costs but obtains only a portion of the benefits, it tends to 
underprovide the goods. If the affected communities cannot negotiate compensation, the 
situation can be corrected by a higher government subsidizing provision of the service, 
with the extent of the spillover determining the degree of subsidy or the matching ratio. 
 
Matching grants can correct inefficiencies from spillovers, but they do not address 
uneven or inadequate fiscal capacities across state and local governments. Local 
governments with ample resources can afford to meet matching requirements and acquire 
a substantial amount of assistance. States with limited fiscal capacities may be unable to 
match federal funds and therefore fail to obtain as much assistance, even though their 
expenditure needs may be equal to or greater than those of wealthier states (Shah 1991). 
Other forms of assistance are needed to equalize fiscal capacities in such cases. 
 
Grantors usually prefer closed-ended matching transfers, in which funds are provided to a 
certain limit, since such transfers permit them to retain control over their budgets. 
Figure 4 shows the effect of closed-ended matching grants on the local budget. AB is the 
original budget line. When $1 of assistance is available for every $3 of local funds spent 
up to a prespecified limit, the budget line becomes ACD. Initially, costs are shared on a 
one-third:two-thirds basis up to a level of OF, at which the subsidy limit of CG (= CE) is 
reached. Expenditures beyond OF receive no subsidy, so the slope of the budget line 
reverts back to 1:1 rather than 1:3 along the subsidized segment, AC. 
 
Empirical studies typically find that closed-ended grants stimulate expenditures on the 
subsidized activity more than open-ended grants (Gramlich 1977; Shah 1994b; Gamkhar 
and Shah, 2006). The estimated response to an additional $1.00 of this kind of grant is 
typically $1.50. Institutional factors may explain this surprisingly large response. 





Source: Shah (1994) 
 
Why are conditional closed-ended matching grants common in industrial countries when 
they seem ill designed to solve problems and inefficiencies in the provision of public 
goods? The answer seems to be that correcting for inefficiencies is not the sole or perhaps 
even the primary objective. Instead, grants are employed to help local governments 
financially while promoting spending on activities given priority by the grantor. The 
conditional (selective) aspects of or conditions on the spending are expected to ensure 
that the funds are directed toward an activity the grantor views as desirable. This, 
however, may be false comfort in view of the potential for fungibility of funds. The local 
matching or cost-sharing component affords the grantor a degree of control, requires a 
degree of financial accountability by the recipient, and makes the cost known to the 
granting government. 
 
Conditional closed-ended matching grants have advantages and disadvantages from the 
grantor’s perspective. While such grants may result in a significant transfer of resources, 
they may distort output and cause inefficiencies, since the aid is often available only for a 
few activities, causing overspending on these functions while other functions are 
underfinanced. If capital outlays are subsidized while operating costs are not, grants may 
induce spending on capital-intensive alternatives.  
 
Conditional open-ended matching grants are the most suitable vehicles to induce lower- 
level governments to increase spending on the assisted function (table 1). If the objective 
is simply to enhance the welfare of local residents, general-purpose nonmatching 
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O  F  B DTable 1 Taxonomy of Grants and Their Conceptual Impacts 
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Note: 1 = highest score, 4 = lowest score. ↑ = positive impact; ↓ = negative impact; a1 = assisted subfunction; A = assisted function; U = unassisted function; G = grant; n.a. = 
not applicable. 
 
Source: Adapted from Shah (1994b).  
To ensure accountability for results, conditional nonmatching output-based transfers are 
preferable to other types of transfers. Output-based transfers respect local autonomy and 
budgetary flexibility while providing incentives and accountability mechanisms to 
improve service delivery performance. The design of such transfers is discussed in the 
next section.  
  
2. Achieving Results-Based Accountability through Performance-Oriented 
Transfers 
Economic rationales for output-based grants (used interchangeably with performance-
oriented transfers in this chapter) stem from the emphasis on contract-based management 
under the new public management framework and strengthening demand for good 
governance by lowering the transactions costs for citizens in obtaining public services 
under the new institutional economics approach. The new public management framework 
seeks to strengthen accountability for results by changing the management paradigm in 
the public sector from permanent appointments to contractual appointment and 
continuation of employment subject to fulfillment of service delivery contracts. It seeks 
to create a competitive service delivery environment by making financing available on 
similar conditions to all providers – government and non-government.  
 
The new institutional economics approach argues that dysfunctional governance in the 
public sector results from opportunistic behavior by public officials, as citizens are either 
not empowered to hold public officials accountable for their noncompliance with their 
mandates and/or for corrupt acts or face high transactions costs in doing so. In this 
framework, citizens are treated as the principals and public officials the agents. The 
principals have bounded rationality—they act rationally based on the incomplete 
information they have. Acquiring and processing information about public sector 
operations is costly. Agents (public officials) are better informed than principals. Their 
self-interest motivates them to withhold information from the public domain, as releasing 
such information helps principals hold them accountable. This asymmetry of information 
allows agents to indulge in opportunistic behavior which goes unchecked due to high 
transactions costs faced by the principals and a lack of or inadequacy of countervailing 
institutions to enforce accountable governance. Results-based accountability through 
output-based grants empowers citizens by increasing their information base and lowering 
their transactions costs in demanding action.  
 
Output-based transfers link grant finance with service delivery performance. These 
transfers place conditions on the results to be achieved while providing full flexibility in 
the design of programs and associated spending levels to achieve those objectives. Such 
transfers help restore recipients’ focus on the results-based chain (figure 5) and the 
alternate service delivery framework (competitive framework for public service delivery) 
to achieve those results. In order to achieve grant objectives, a public manager in the 
recipient government would examine the results-based chain to determine whether or not 
program activities are expected to yield the desired results. To do so, he or she needs to 
monitor program activities and inputs, including intermediate inputs (resources used to 
produce outputs), outputs (quantity and quality of public goods and services produced and access to such goods and services), outcomes (intermediate- to long-run 
consequences for consumers/taxpayers of public service provision or progress in 
achieving program objectives), impact (program goals or very long-term consequences of 
public service provision), and reach (people who benefit from or are hurt by a program). 
Such a managerial focus reinforces joint ownership and accountability of the principal 
and the agent in achieving shared goals by highlighting terms of mutual trust. Thus 
internal and external reporting shifts from the traditional focus on inputs to a focus on 
outputs, reach, and outcomes—in particular, outputs that lead to results. Flexibility in 
project definition and implementation is achieved by shifting emphasis from strict 
monitoring of inputs to monitoring performance results and their measurements. Tracking 
progress toward expected results is done through indicators, which are negotiated 
between the provider and the financing agency. This joint goal setting and reporting helps 
ensure client satisfaction on an ongoing basis while building partnership and ownership 
into projects (Shah 2005b).  
 
Figure 5 Results Chain with an Application to Education Services 
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Output-based grants must have conditions on outputs as opposed to outcomes, as 
outcomes are subject to influence by factors beyond the control of a public manager. 
Public managers should be held accountable only for factors under their control. 
Outcome-based conditions diffuse enforcement of accountability for results. Since the 
grant conditions are concerned with service delivery performance in terms of quality of 
output and access, the manager is free to choose the program and inputs to deliver results. 
To achieve those results, he or she faces positive incentives by grant conditions that 
encourage alternate service delivery mechanisms by contracting out, outsourcing, or 
simply encouraging competition among government and nongovernment providers. This 
can be done by establishing a level playing field through at par financing, by offering 
franchises through competitive bidding, or by providing rewards for performance through 
benchmarking or yardstick competition. Such an incentive environment is expected to 
yield a management paradigm that emphasizes results-based accountability to clients with 
the following common elements: 
 •  Contracts or work program agreements based on pre-specified outputs and 
performance targets and budgetary allocations. 
•  Replacement of lifelong rotating employment with contractual appointments 
with task specialization. 
•  Managerial flexibility but accountability for results. 
•  Redefinition of public sector role as purchaser but not necessarily provider of 
public services. 
•  Adoption of the subsidiarity principle—that is, public sector decisions made at 
the level of government closest to the people, unless a convincing case can be 
made not to do so. 
•  Incentives for cost efficiency. 
•  Incentives for transparency and competitive service provision. 
•  Accountability to taxpayers. 
 
Under such an accountable governance framework, grant-financed budget allocations 
support contracts and work program agreements, which are based on prespecified outputs 
and performance targets. The grant recipient’s flexibility in input selection—including 
hiring and firing of personnel and implementation of programs—is fully respected, but 
there is strict accountability for achieving results. The incentive and accountability 
regime created by output-based transfers is expected to create responsive, responsible, 
and accountable governance without undermining local autonomy. In contrast, traditional 
conditional grants with input conditionality undermine local autonomy and budgetary 
flexibility while reinforcing a culture of opportunism and rent seeking (table 2).  
 Table 2 Features of Traditional and Output-Based Conditional Grants 
Feature  Traditional grant  Output-based grant 
Grant objectives   Spending levels  Quality and access to public 
services 
Grant design and administration  Complex  Simple and transparent 
Eligibility Recipient  government 
departments/agencies 
Recipient government provides 
funds to all government and 
nongovernment providers 
Conditions Expenditures  on  authorized 
functions and objects 
Outputs -service delivery results 
Allocation criteria  Program or project proposals 
approvals with expenditure 
details 
Demographic data on potential 
clients 
Compliance verification  Higher level inspections and 
audits 
Client feedback and redress, 
comparison of baseline and 
postgrant data on quality and 
access 
Penalties   Audit observations on financial 
compliance 
Public censure, competitive 
pressures, voice and exit options 
for clients 
Managerial flexibility  Little or none. No tolerance for 
risk and no accountability for 
failure.  
Absolute. Rewards for risks but 
penalties for persistent failure. 
Local government autonomy and 
budgetary flexibility 
Little Absolute 
Transparency Little  Absolute 
Focus  Internal  External, competition, innovation 
and benchmarking 
Accountability  Hierarchical to higher-level 
government, controls on inputs 
and process with little or no 





Output-based grants create incentive regimes that promote a results-based accountability 
culture. Consider the case in which the national government aims to improve access to 
education by the poor and to enhance the quality of such education. A common approach 
is to provide grants to government schools through conditional grants. These grants 
specify the type of expenditures eligible for grant financing (books, computers, teacher 
aids, and so forth) as well as financial reporting and audit requirements. Such input 
conditionality undermines budgetary autonomy and flexibility without providing any 
assurance about the achievement of results. Moreover, in practice it is difficult to enforce, 
as there may be significant opportunities for fungibility of funds. Experience has shown 
that there is no one-to-one link between increases in public spending and improvements 
in service delivery performance (see Huther, Roberts, and Shah 1997).  
 
Output-based design of such grants can help achieve accountability for results. Under this 
approach, the national government allocates funds to local governments based on the size 
of the school-age population. Local governments in turn pass these funds on to both 
government and non-government providers based on school enrollments. Non-
government providers are eligible to receive grant funds if they admit students based on 
merit and provide a tuition subsidy to students whose parents cannot afford the tuition. All providers are expected to improve or at the minimum maintain baseline achievement 
scores on standardized tests, increase graduation rates, and reduce dropout rates. Failure 
to do so will invite public censure and in the extreme case cause grant funds to be 
discontinued. In the meantime, reputation risks associated with poor performance may 
reduce enrollments, thereby reducing the grant funds received. Schools have full 
autonomy in the use of grant funds and are able to retain unused funds.  
 
This kind of grant financing would create an incentive environment for both government 
and non-government schools to compete and excel to retain students and establish 
reputations for quality education, as parental choice determines grant financing to each 
school. Such an environment is particularly important for government schools, where 
staff have lifelong appointments and financing is ensured regardless of performance. 
Budgetary flexibility and retention of savings would encourage innovation to deliver 
quality education.  
 
Output-based grants thus preserve autonomy, encourage competition and innovation, and 
bring strict accountability for results to residents. This accountability regime is self- 
enforcing through consumer (parental choice in the current example) choice.  
 
3. Designing Fiscal Transfers: Dividing the Spoils or Creating a Framework for 
Accountable and Equitable Governance? 
 
The design of fiscal transfers is critical to ensuring the efficiency and equity of local 
service provision and the fiscal health of subnational governments (for a comprehensive 
treatment of the economic rationale of intergovernmental fiscal transfers, see Boadway 
and Shah forthcoming). A few simple considerations can be helpful in designing these 
transfers: 
 
Guidelines for Grant Design 
 
1.  Clarity in grant objectives. Grant objectives should be clearly and precisely 
specified to guide grant design.  
2.  Autonomy. Subnational governments should have complete independence and 
flexibility in setting priorities. They should not be constrained by the categorical 
structure of programs and uncertainty associated with decisionmaking at the 
center. Tax-base sharing—allowing subnational governments to introduce their 
own tax rates on central bases, formula-based revenue sharing, or bloc grants—is 
consistent with this objective. 
3.  Revenue adequacy. Subnational governments should have adequate revenues to 
discharge designated responsibilities. 
4.  Responsiveness. The grant program should be flexible enough to accommodate 
unforeseen changes in the fiscal situation of the recipients.  
5.  Equity (fairness). Allocated funds should vary directly with fiscal need factors 
and inversely with the tax capacity of each jurisdiction. 
6.  Predictability. The grant mechanism should ensure predictability of subnational 
governments’ shares by publishing five-year projections of funding availability. The grant formula should specify ceilings and floors for yearly fluctuations. Any 
major changes in the formula should be accompanied by hold harmless or 
grandfathering provisions. 
7.  Transparency. Both the formula and the allocations should be disseminated 
widely, in order to achieve as broad a consensus as possible on the objectives and 
operation of the program. 
8.  Efficiency. The grant design should be neutral with respect to subnational 
governments’ choices of resource allocation to different sectors or types of 
activity. 
9.  Simplicity. Grant allocation should be based on objective factors over which 
individual units have little control. The formula should be easy to understand, in 
order not to reward grantsmanship. 
10. Incentive. The design should provide incentives for sound fiscal management and 
discourage inefficient practices. Specific transfers to finance subnational 
government deficits should not be made. 
11. Reach. All grant-financed programs create winners and losers. Consideration 
must be given to identifying beneficiaries and those who will be adversely 
affected to determine the overall usefulness and sustainability of the program. 
12. Safeguarding of grantor’s objectives. Grantor’s objectives are best safeguarded by 
having grant conditions specify the results to be achieved (output-based grants) 
and by giving the recipient flexibility in the use of funds. 
13. Affordability. The grant program must recognize donors’ budget constraints. This 
suggests that matching programs should be closed ended.  
14. Singular focus. Each grant program should focus on a single objective. 
15. Accountability for results. The grantor must be accountable for the design and 
operation of the program. The recipient must be accountable to the grantor and its 
citizens for financial integrity and results—that is, improvements in service 
delivery performance. Citizens’ voice and exit options in grant design can help 
advance bottom-up accountability objectives.  
 
Some of these criteria may be in conflict with others. Grantors may therefore have to 
assign priorities to various factors in comparing design alternatives  (Shah 1994b); 
Canada 2006). 
 
For enhancing government accountability to voters, it is desirable to match revenue 
means (the ability to raise revenues from own sources) as closely as possible with 
expenditure needs at all levels of government. However, higher-level governments must 
be allowed greater access to revenues than needed to fulfill their own direct service 
responsibilities, so that they are able to use their spending power through fiscal transfers 
to fulfill national and regional efficiency and equity objectives.  
 
Six broad objectives for national fiscal transfers can be identified. Each of these 
objectives may apply to varying degrees in different countries; each calls for a specific 
design of fiscal transfers. Lack of attention in design to specific objectives leads to 
negative perceptions of these grants (box 1).  
Box 1 Well-Founded Negative Perceptions of Intergovernmental Finance 
 
Perceptions of intergovernmental finance are generally negative. Many federal officials believe 
that giving money and power to subnational governments is like giving whiskey and car keys to 
teenagers. They believe that grant monies enable these governments to go on spending binge and 
the national government then is faced with the consequences of their reckless spending behaviors.  
Past spending behavior of provincial and local officials also demonstrates that ‘grant money does 
not buy anything’ meaning that it is treated as a windfall gain and wastefully expended with little 
to show for in service delivery improvements. Citizens perceive the granting of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers as the magical art of passing money from one government to 
another and seeing it vanish into thin air.  
 
These perceptions are well grounded in reality in developing countries, where the primary focus 
of fiscal transfers is on dividing the spoils. In developing (and industrial) countries, four types of 
transfers are common: 
•  Passing the buck transfers. These are general revenue–sharing programs that employ 
multiple factors that work at cross purposes. Argentina, Brazil, India, the Philippines, 
and many other countries have such ongoing programs. 
•  Asking for more trouble grants. These are grants that finance subnational deficits, in 
the process encouraging higher and higher deficits. China, Hungary, and India 
provide this type of grants. 
•  Pork barrel transfers. In the past politically opportunistic grants were common in 
Brazil and Pakistan. They are currently in vogue in India and Western countries 
especially the United States of America.  
•  Command and control transfers. These are grants with conditions on inputs. They are 
used to micromanage and interfere in local decisionmaking. They are widely 










Bridging Vertical Fiscal Gaps 
The terms vertical fiscal gap and vertical fiscal imbalance have been mistakenly used 
interchangeably in recent literature on fiscal decentralization. A vertical fiscal gap  is 
defined as the revenue deficiency arising from a mismatch between revenue means and 
expenditure needs, typically of lower orders of government. A national government may 
have more revenues than warranted by its direct and indirect spending responsibilities; 
regional and local governments may have less revenues than their expenditure 
responsibilities.  
 
A vertical fiscal imbalance occurs when the vertical fiscal gap is not adequately addressed 
by the reassignment of responsibilities or by fiscal transfers and other means. Boadway 
(2002b) argues that vertical fiscal imbalance incorporates an ideal or optimum view of 
expenditures by different orders of government and is therefore hard to measure.  
  
Vertical fiscal gap may arise due to (a) inappropriate assignment of responsibilities; or (b) 
centralization of taxing powers; or (c) pursuit of beggar-thy-neighbor tax policies (wasteful 
tax competition) by subnational governments; and (d) lack of tax room at subantional levels 
due to heavier tax burdens imposed by the central government. To deal with the vertical fiscal gap, it is important to deal with its sources through a combination of policies such as 
the reassignment of responsibilities, tax decentralization or tax abatement by the center and 
tax-base sharing (by allowing subnational governments to levy supplementary rates on a 
national tax base). Only as a last resort should revenue sharing, or unconditional formula-
based transfers, all of which weaken accountability to local taxpayers, be considered to deal 
with this gap. Taxation by tax-sharing, as practiced in China and India, is particularly 
undesirable, as it creates incentives for donors to exert less effort in collecting taxes that are 
shared than they would collecting taxes that are fully retained. In industrial countries the 
fiscal gap is usually dealt with by tax decentralization or tax-base sharing. Canada and the 
Nordic countries have achieved harmonized personal and corporate income tax systems by 
allowing the central government to provide tax abatement and subnational governments to 
impose supplementary rates on the national tax base. In developing countries and transition 
economies, both tax by tax sharing and general revenue sharing are typically used to deal 
with the fiscal gap.  
 
A number of countries, including China, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and South 
Africa, have in the past, provided deficit grants to fill fiscal gaps at subnational levels—
with unwelcome results in terms of mushrooming of subnational deficits. These grants are 
still in vogue in China, Hungary, and South Africa.  
 
Bridging the Fiscal Divide through Fiscal Equalization Transfers 
Fiscal equalization transfers are advocated to deal with regional fiscal equity concerns. 
These transfers are justified on political and economic considerations.  
 
Large regional fiscal disparities can be politically divisive and may even create threats of 
secession (Shankar and Shah 2003). This threat is quite real: since 1975 about 40 new 
countries have been created by the break-up of existing political unions. Fiscal equalization 
transfers could forestall such threats and create a sense of political participation, as 
demonstrated by the impact of such transfers on the separatist movement in Quebec, 
Canada.  
 
Decentralized decisionmaking results in differential net fiscal benefits (imputed benefits 
from public spending minus tax burden) for citizens depending on the fiscal capacities of 
their place of residence. This leads to both fiscal inequity and fiscal inefficiency in resource 
allocation. Fiscal inequity arises as citizens with identical incomes are treated differently 
depending on their place of residence. Fiscal inefficiency in resource allocation results 
from people in their relocation decisions comparing gross income (private income plus net 
public sector benefits minus cost of moving) at new locations; economic efficiency 
considerations warrant comparing private income minus moving costs only without any 
regard to public sector benefits. A nation that values horizontal equity (the equal treatment 
of all citizens nationwide) and fiscal efficiency needs to correct the fiscal inequity and 
inefficiency that naturally arise in a decentralized government. Grants from the central 
government to states and/or local governments can eliminate these differences in net fiscal 
benefits if the transfers depend on the tax capacity of each state relative to others and on the 
relative need for and cost of providing public services. The more decentralized the tax 
system is, the greater the need for equalizing transfers.   
The elimination of net fiscal benefits requires a comprehensive fiscal equalization program 
that equalizes fiscal capacity (the ability to raise revenues from own basis using national 
average tax rates) to a national average standard and provides compensation for differential 
expenditure needs and costs due to inherent cost disabilities rather than differences that 
reflect different policies. Some economists argue that if public sector tax burdens and 
service benefits are fully capitalized in property values, the case for fiscal equalization 
transfers is weaker, as residents in rich states pay more for private services and less for 
public services and vice versa in poorer states. According to this view, as argued by Oates 
(1982), fiscal equalization is a matter of political taste. This view has gained currency at the 
federal level in the United States and explains why there is no federal fiscal equalization 
program there. In contrast, local fiscal equalization drives most state assistance to local 
governments in the USA, especially school finance (box 2). 
 
Box 2 Financing Schools in the United States 
 
U.S. states have taken various approaches to school finance. The states of Hawaii, Idaho, and 
Washington fully finance primary and secondary education. In contrast, New Hampshire covers 
only 9 percent of school finance.  
 
Delaware and North Carolina finance education through bloc grants that are indexed to 
population, GDP, and inflation growth rates. The grants are derived by calculating equal amounts 
per unit based on the number of students, teachers, classrooms, courses, classes, and other factors. 
The units can be standardized using various yardsticks, such as class size and teacher:pupil ratios. 
Various measures of students, including enrollment, average daily attendance, enrollment 
weighted by grades, types of programs, and number of students with special needs, are used.  
 
Other states use equalization grants, including foundation grants, percentage equalization grants, 
and district power equalization grants.  
 
Foundation grants vary inversely with the fiscal capacity of a school board. The grant allocation 
is based on an application of the representative tax system approach to fiscal capacity 
equalization per student across school districts. The following formula is used: 
 
foundation grant = (maximum per student grant – own school district contribution per student 
based on mandated minimum tax rate applied to per student tax base) x enrollment 
 
Forty-two states have adopted variants of this approach, with 22 states specifying the minimum 
mandated tax rate. Various measures are used to determine enrollment, including the number of 
students on the rolls on a specified date, average daily attendance, and average attendance over a 
period. Most states (36) use a scheme that weights enrollment by grade, program, and student 
disabilities.  
 
Rhode Island uses a percentage equalization grant—a matching cum equalization grant for 
school spending based on the following formula: 
 
grant per student = [1– matching rate x (per capita tax capacity in the district/ state average 
district tax capacity per capita)] x district spending per capita  
  
District power equalization grants, used in Indiana and Washington, include incentives for 
increased tax effort in an equalizing grant. The formula used is: 
 
grant = (per capita average fiscal capacity – per capita fiscal capacity of the district) x district 
tax rate  
 
Source: Vaillancourt (1998).  
 
Conceptually, full capitalization requires a small open area with costless mobility. Most 
federations and even states in large countries do not fulfill this condition. As a result, 
criticism of fiscal equalization using the capitalization argument may have only weak 
empirical support (Shah, 1988a).  
 
In principle, a properly designed fiscal equalization transfers program corrects distortions 
that may cause fiscally induced migration by equalizing net fiscal benefits across states. 
A reasonable estimate of the costs and benefits of providing public services in various 
states is essential to measure net fiscal benefits. Measures of differential revenue-raising 
abilities and the needs and costs of providing public services in different states must be 
developed. Equalization of net fiscal benefits could then be attempted by adopting a 
standard of equalization and establishing the means of financing the needed transfers.  
 
Measuring Fiscal Capacity 
Estimating fiscal capacity—the ability of governmental units to raise revenues from their 
own sources—is conceptually and empirically difficult. The two most common ways of 
doing so are with macroeconomic indicators and the representative tax system. 
 
Various measures of income and output serve as indicators of the ability of residents of a 
state to bear tax burdens. Among the better known measures are the following:  
•  State gross domestic product (GDP). State GDP represents the total value of 
goods and services produced within a state. It is an imperfect guide to the ability 
of a state government to raise taxes, since a significant portion of income may 
accrue to nonresident owners of factors of production. For example, the Northern 
Territory has the highest per capita income in Australia, but it is treated as the 
poorest jurisdiction in federal-state fiscal relations.  
•  State factor income. State factor income includes all income—capital and labor—
earned in the state. It makes no distinction between income earned and income 
retained by residents. 
•  State factor income accruing to residents only. This measure represents a more 
useful measure, provided states are able to tax factor income.  
•  State personal income. The sum of all income received by residents of a state is a 
reasonable measure of the state’s ability to bear tax burdens. It is an imperfect and 
partial measure of the ability to impose tax burdens, however, and therefore not a 
satisfactory measure of overall fiscal capacity. 
•  Personal disposable income. Personal disposable income equals personal income 
minus direct and indirect taxes plus transfers. This concept is subject to the same 
limitations affecting personal income.  
In general, macro measures do not reflect the ability of subnational governments to raise 
revenues from own sources. Boadway argues against the use of macro indicators in an 
equalization formula on the grounds that a macro formula “ignores the fact that fiscal 
inefficiency and fiscal inequity are the products of the actual mix of taxes chosen by 
provincial governments” (Boadway, 2002a, 12). This neglect runs the risk of violating 
the principles of equalization itself. A second major difficulty in the use of macro 
indicators is the availability of accurate and timely data at subnational levels. Such data 
become available only with significant lags, and the accuracy of such data may be 
questionable. Use of these data may therefore invite controversy (see Aubut and 
Vaillancourt 2001 for a Canadian illustration of this point). Despite these problems, both 
Brazil and India use macro indicators in their federal-state revenue-sharing programs.  
  
The representative tax system approach measures the fiscal capacity of a state by the 
revenue that could be raised if the government employed all of the standard sources at the 
nationwide average intensity of use. Estimating equalization entitlements using the 
representative tax system requires information on the tax bases and tax revenues for each 
state. Fiscal capacity of the have-not states is brought up to the median, mean, or other 
norm. Using the mean of all states as a standard, the state equalization entitlement for a 
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where  E
i is the equalization entitlement of state x from revenue source i,  POP is 
population, PCTB
i is the per capita tax base of revenue source i, t
i is the national average 
tax rate of revenue source i, subscript na is the national average, and subscript x is state x. 
The equalization entitlement for a state from a particular revenue source can be negative, 
positive, or zero. The total of these values indicates whether a state receives a positive or 
negative entitlement from the interstate revenue-sharing pool. Since data on major tax 
bases and tax collections required to implement representative tax system are usually 
published regularly by various levels of government, the representative tax system does 
not impose new data requirements and can be readily implemented in countries that have 
decentralized taxing responsibility to subnational levels, as most transition economies do. 
Of course, implementing such a system will not be feasible in countries with limited tax 
decentralization (very large vertical fiscal gaps) or poor tax administration.  
 
Measuring Expenditure Needs 
The case for fiscal equalization rests on eliminating different net fiscal benefits across 
states that give rise to fiscally induced migration. Such differential net fiscal benefits can 
arise as a result of decentralization of taxing authority and decentralized public 
expenditures. Differences in the demographic composition of the population across 
jurisdictions will result in differential needs for decentralized public services, such as 
education, health and social welfare. Differences in age distribution affect the need for 
schools, hospitals, and recreational facilities. Differences in the incidence of poverty and 
disease may affect the need for education, training, health, social services, and transfer 
payments. Jurisdictions with higher need factors would have greater need for revenues to provide comparable levels of public services at comparable levels of taxation. These need 
differentials are likely to cause substantial variations across jurisdictions in the level and 
mix of public goods provided, resulting in different net fiscal benefits A strong case for 
equalization can be established on grounds of efficiency and equity to compensate for 
need differentials that give rise to different net fiscal benefits. 
 
The fiscal federalism literature treats differential costs as synonymous with differential 
needs, but some cost differences may arise from deliberate policy decisions by 
subnational governments rather than differences in need. Boadway (2004) argues that 
even for inherent cost disadvantages, such as differences between urban and rural areas, 
the equity advantage of more equal provision must be weighed against the efficiency 
costs. If it is more costly to deliver public services in rural areas than urban areas, it is 
inefficient for an equalization program to neutralize these cost differences. Even in 
unitary states, the level of public services in remote, rural, or mountainous areas is 
usually lower than in more densely populated urban areas. Under a decentralized fiscal 
system, a policy choice must be made about minimum standards, but there is no 
justification for providing the same level of services in remote and urban areas, as the 
Australian fiscal need equalization program does. Instead, as Boadway suggests, one 
could stratify locations in all regions by their costs and equalize across regions within 
comparable strata. Equalization grants should partially offset only inherent disabilities, 
disregarding cost differences that reflect deliberate policy decisions or differences in the 
efficiency with which resources are used.  
 
In practice, expenditure need is more difficult to define and derive than fiscal capacity. 
The difficulties include defining an equalization standard; understanding differences in 
demographics, service areas, populations, local needs, and policies; and understanding 
strategic behavior of recipient states. Despite these formidable difficulties, numerous 
attempts have been made to measure expenditure need. The approaches can be broadly 
classified into three main categories: (a) ad hoc determination of expenditure needs, (b) 
representative expenditure system using direct imputation methods, and (c) the theory-
based representative expenditure system.  
 
(a) Ad hoc determination of expenditure needs uses simple measures of expenditure 
needs in general-purpose transfers. The factors used and their relative weights are 
arbitrarily determined. Germany uses population size and population density adjustments, 
China uses the number of public employees, India uses measures of backwardness.  
 
The Canadian provinces use simple measures of expenditure need in their general-
purpose transfers to municipalities These include population size, population density, 
population growth factors, road length, number of dwelling units, location factors (such 
as northern location), urbanization factors (primary urban population and urban/rural 
class) and social assistance payments (see Shah 1994b). The most sophisticated of these 
approaches is the one taken by Saskatchewan, where the standard municipal 
expenditure of a class of municipalities is assumed to be a function of the total 
population of the class. Regression analysis is used to derive a graduated standard per 
capita expenditure table for municipal governments by population class.   
An interesting example of the application of this approach is South Africa’s use of it in its 
equitable share transfers to the provinces (South Africa 2006). The equitable share 
formula applicable for 2006–08 focuses almost entirely on need factors, with only a 1 
percent weight given to negative needs (per capita GDP). The formula uses the following 
shares: 
•  A basic share (14 percent weight) is derived from each province’s share of the 
national population. 
•  An education share (51 percent) is based on the size of the school-age population 
(5–17) and the average number of learners (grades R–12) enrolled in public 
ordinary schools over the past three years. 
•  A health share (26 percent) is based on the proportion of the population with and 
without access to medical aid. 
•  An institutional component (5 percent) is divided equally among the provinces. 
•  A poverty component (3 percent) is based on incidence of poverty.  
•  An economic output component (1 percent) is based on data on GDP by region.  
 
(b) The representative expenditure system using direct imputation methods seeks to 
create a parallel system to the representative tax system on the expenditure side. This is 
done by dividing subnational expenditures into various functions, determining total 
expenditures by each jurisdiction for each function, identifying relative need/cost factors, 
assigning relative weights using direct imputation methods or regression analysis, and 
allocating total expenditures of all jurisdictions on each function across jurisdictions on 
the basis of their relative costs and needs for each function (see table 3 for a compilation 
of need factors used in industrial countries).  
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Table 3 Measurement of Fiscal Needs by Service Category  
 
Category  Measurement Unit        Per Unit Cost  Components of Adjustment Index 
Primary and   
Secondary 
Education 
population of school 
ages (e.g, age 7-18) 
 
the country's per capita 
public expenditure on 
primary and secondary 
education 
 
wage index = the ratio of teachers' wage level to the national average; 
rental cost index = the ratio of per square rental cost to the national average; 
student disability index = the ratio of the percentage of students with physical disabilities to 
the national average; 
poor family index = the ratio of the percentage of students from low-income families to the 
national average. 
Health total  population  the country's per capita 
public expenditure on 
health care 
 
health price index = the ratio of health care cost to the national average; 
infant mortality index = the ratio of infant mortality rate to the national average; 
inverse life expectancy index = the ratio of national average life expectancy to life 
expectancy in this region; 
inverse population density index = the ratio of national average population density to that in 
this region; 
Transportation  total length of roads in 
this region 
the country's per capita 
public expenditure on 
transportation 
wage index = the ratio of wage level to the national average; 
grade index = the ratio of average road grade to the national average; 
snow index = the ratio of annual snowfall to the national average; 
inverse population density index = the ratio of national average population density to that in 
this region; 
Police and Fire  total population in the 
region   
the country’s per capita 
public expenditure on  
police and fire         
protection 
wage index = the ratio of wage level to the national average; 
crime index = the ratio of per capita crime rate to the national average; 
fire index = the ratio of per capita number of fires to the national average; 
urbanization index = the ratio of proportion of population in urban areas in the region of 
municipality to the national average; 
Social Welfare  total population in this 
region 
the country's per capita 
public expenditure on 
social welfare 
minimum wage index = the ratio of minimum wage level to the national average; 
poverty index = the ratio of percentage of low-income population to the national average; 
old age index = the ratio of percentage of old population (e.g., age 60 or above) to the 
national average; 
unemployment index = the ratio of unemployment rate to the national average; 
disability index = the ratio of percentage of physically disabled people to the national 
average; 
Other services  total population in this 
region 
the country's per capita 
public expenditure on 
other services 
wage index = the ratio of wage level to the national average; 
real cost index = the ratio of per square rental cost to the national average; 
urbanization index of the region = the ratio of proportion of population in urban areas in the 
region of municipality to the national average;  
Source: Barati and Szalai  (2000), p.42.  26
The advantage of this approach is that it obviates the need for the very elaborate 
calculations and assumptions needed to quantify the provision of services at some defined 
level. It does so by using the sum of actual total expenditures as the point of departure for 
measuring expenditure needs, reducing the problem to one of allocating total need among 
subnational governments on the basis of selected indicators of need, including proxies for 
need if desired. The disadvantage of this approach is that it does not necessarily exclude 
expenses incurred by any of the provinces that go beyond the concept of a “reasonable 
level of public service.” However, the approach can be adjusted to exclude identifiable 
excesses from total expenditures (for example gold standards for some services or 
relatively unafforadble benefits provided by some rich states) in respect of which needs 
are to be allocated. 
 
A sophisticated variant of this methodology is used by the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission of Australia, which defines expenditure as the cost of supplying average 
performance levels for the existing mix of state-local programs. Relative expenditure 
needs are then determined empirically using direct imputation methods for 41 state-local 
expenditures. The following hypothetical example illustrates the treatment of welfare 
expenditures using a crude approach similar to that used by the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission for establishing expenditure needs under a representative expenditure 
system.  
 
Assume that there are 10 states in Grantland, that the unit costs of welfare are equal in all 
states, and that needs for welfare vary based on the percentage of the working-age 
population that is unemployed, the percentage of the population that is not of working 
age, and the percentage of families with a single parent. The independent grants 
commission assigns a 40 percent weight to the percentage of the working-age population 
that is unemployed, a 35 percent weight to the percentage of the population that is not of 
working age, and a 25 percent weight to the percentage of families with a single parent. 
Assume that expenditures by all states for welfare total $5 billion and that state A 
accounts for 4.8 percent of the 10-state total for the first factor, 3.0 percent of the total for 
the second factor, and 2.2 percent of the total for the third factor. State A’s estimated need 
for a standard level of welfare expenditure would then equal:  
 
$5 billion x (0.048 x 0.40) + (0.03 x 0.35) + (0.022 x 0.25) = $176 million, 
 
or 3.2 percent of all state expenditures.  
 
 Shah (1994a) provides an application of the approach using provincial-local expenditure 
functions for Canada and uses quantitative analysis in selection and weighting of factors 
for various l expenditure functions (see table 4).  
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Table 4 Weighting of factors for provincial-local expenditure functions for Canada 
 
Expenditure Category  Need/Cost Factors  Relative Weights 
Snowfall (Annual - in centimeters) SNOW   0.1020 
Highway Construction Price Index (HCPI)   0.6580 
Paved roads and streets per square kilometer of area (RSPR)   0.0005 
Transportation & 
Communications 
Non-cultivatable area as a proportion of total area (NCAR) 
Total 





Full time enrollment in grade 13+(000)(PSS)  0.048 
Percentage of Population having a minority language as mother 
tongue (ML) 
0.19 
Provincial Unemployment Rate (UR)  0.018 
Education Price Index (EPI)  0.717 
Help Wanted Index (HWI)  0.010 





Index = (0.18*IPSS + .70*IML + .08*IUR + .04*IFPS)*IHWI*IEPI 
Population under 18 (PO17)  0.014 
Population Density (PD)  0.017 
Education Price Index (EPI)  0.969 
  
Total 1.000 
Elementary and Secondary 
Education (ESE) 
Index = (.02*IPD + ,98*IEPI)*IP017 
Alcoholism (Hospital separations for Alcohol related cases) 
(ALCO)  
0.123 




Index = (0.123*IALCO + 0.877*IPU) 
Social Services (SS)  Single Parent Families (SPF)  1.00 
Criminal Code Offenses (CCO)  0.39 




Index = (.39*ICCO + .61*IPMAR) 
Private sector wages (Industrial composite) (AMW)  0.769 
Percentage of population having a minority language as mother 
tongue (ML) 
0.001 
Population Density (PD)  0.023 
Population (POPF)  0.039 
Snowfall (Annual - in centimeters) (SNOW)  0.168 
 
Total 1.000 
General Services (GS) 
Index = (. 001*ML + 0.175*ISNOW + 0.80*IAMW + .024*IPD)*IPOPF 
Note: Calculations based on regression coefficients. The use of a variable prefixed by I means that a relative index of 
the variable is used.   
 
Source: Shah (1994a) 
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This approach is highly subjective and therefore potentially controversial. Recent 
experience in Australia vividly demonstrates the problems that arise if such an approach 
is followed in practice as discussed in the following section. Some subjectivity and 
imprecision can be alleviated by using quantitative analysis in choosing factors and 
weights, as Shah suggests (1994a).  
 
(c) The theory-based representative expenditure system. The representative expenditure 
system can be significantly improved using a conceptual framework that embodies 
appropriately defined concept of fiscal need and properly specified expenditure functions 
that are estimated using objective quantitative analysis, as proposed by Shah (1996) for 
Canada. Under this refined approach, the so-called the theory-based  representative 
expenditure system, the equalization entitlement from expenditure category i equals the 
per capita potential expenditure of state A for category i based on own need factors if it 
had national average fiscal capacity minus per capita potential expenditure of state A on 
expenditure category i if it had national average need factors and national average fiscal 
capacity.  
 
This approach is even more difficult to implement than the less refined approach, but it 
has the advantage of objectivity and it enables the analyst to derive measures based on 
actual observed behavior rather than ad hoc value judgments. The relative weights 
assigned to various need factors and their impact on allocation of grant funds are 
determined by econometric analysis. Furthermore, this approach yields both the total pool 
and the allocation of fiscal need equalization grants among recipient units. This method 
requires specifying determinants for each service category, including relevant fiscal 
capacity and public service need variables. A properly specified regression equation 
yields quantitative estimates of the influence each factor has in determining spending 
levels of a category of public service. This information can be analyzed to determine 
what each state would actually have spent if it had national average fiscal capacity and 
but actual need factors. This then can be compared to the standard expenditure for each 
service based upon an evaluation of the same equation for determining what each state 
would have spent if it had the national average fiscal capacity and also national average 
need factors. The sum of differences of these two expressions for all expenditure 
categories would determine whether or not the state had more (if sum was positive) or 
less than the average needs (if sum was negative) (see Shah 1996 for a Canadian 
application of this approach).  
 
The formula for equalization entitlement based on expenditure classification i for state x 




x = (POP) x [(PCSE)
i






x  is the equalization entitlement for expenditure classification i for state x, 
POPx is the population of state x, PCSE
i
x  is the per capita standardized expenditure by 
state x on expenditure classification i (or the estimated amount the state would have spent   29
to meet actual needs if it had national average fiscal capacity), and PCSE
i
na is the 
national average per capita standardized expenditure for classification i. This is the 
estimated expenditure for all states, based on national average values of fiscal capacity 
and need. The equalization entitlement for a particular expenditure classification could be 
positive, negative, or zero. The total of these entitlements in all expenditure categories is 
considered for equalization. 
 
A comprehensive system of equalization determines the overall entitlement of a state by 
considering its separate entitlements from the representative tax system and the 
representative expenditure system. Only states with positive net entitlements are eligible 
for transfers of all or some fraction of the total amount, with the fraction determined by 
the central government based on the availability of funds. 
 
Practical Difficulties in Equalizing Expenditure Needs: Australia’s Experience  
The Commonwealth Grants Commission of Australia found the theory-based 
representative expenditure system approach difficult to implement. It opted instead for an 
alternate representative expenditure system using direct imputation methods that simply 
equalizes what all states on average actually spend. The Australian system seeks absolute 
comparability for all 41 state-local services rather than just merit goods (some would 
question whether this is worth pursuing).  
 
Australia’s approach raises several questions. Is equal access to all services in remote 
areas desirable at any cost? If a rich state decides to buy limousines for its officials, or 
make higher welfare payments to its aboriginal population, why should equalization 
payments to poorer states go up? Such an approach diverts states’ energies to 
demonstrate that they “need more to do less” or “money does not buy much” as opposed 
to “doing more with less.” as higher spending is rewarded and cost-saving in delivering 
improved services is discouraged by the equalization grant formula. Such a system 
rewards some bad behaviors, including excessive use of some services by specific 
groups, tax expenditures by states to attract capital and labor, and state assumption of 
contingent and non-contingent liabilities.  
 
In addition to conceptual difficulties, the Australian program is plagued with 
measurement problems. The determinants of expenditure needs for various expenditure 
categories are arrived at based on broad judgments. Arbitrary procedures are used to 
derive factor weights and combine various factors into functional forms. State disabilities 
stemming from various factors are multiplied. For highly correlated factors, disabilities 
are artificially magnified through double counting and multiplication. The Australian 
experience highlights the practical difficulties associated with implementing fiscal need 
compensation as part of a comprehensive fiscal equalization approach (see Shah 2004).  
 
Conclusions regarding the Practice of Fiscal Need Equalization    
Fiscal capacity equalization is relatively straightforward to comprehend and feasible (with 
some difficulty) to implement once a (political) decision is made on the standard of 
equalization. Fiscal need equalization is a complex and potentially controversial 
proposition, because by its very nature it requires making subjective judgments and using   30
imprecise analytical methods. An analytical approach such as regression analysis using 
historical data is inappropriate when underlying structures are subject to change due to 
technology and other dynamic considerations. Great care is needed to specify determinants 
of each service.  
 
Australia’s Commonwealth Grants Commission makes these calculations using broad 
judgments and sampling services. With the single exception of the Northern Territory, 
which has a large aboriginal population, there is little cross-state variations in the 
expenditure needs of the Australian states. A special grant for the Northern Territory would 
simplify the Australian program while achieving its equalization objectives.  
 
Very few countries opt for a comprehensive program of fiscal equalization. In contrast, a 
few industrial countries use fiscal capacity equalization programs, both at the federal-state 
(Canada, Switzerland) and state-local levels (Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark). 
Fiscal need compensation is important, but for the sake of simplicity and objectivity, 
rather than implement a fiscal need equalization approach as part of the fiscal 
equalization program, it may be better instead to achieve fiscal needs compensation on a 
service by service basis through output-based national minimum standards grants. South 
Africa, however, as discussed earlier, does not use output-based transfers and instead 
compensates for fiscal needs on a service-by-service basis in determining provincial 
entitlements for central general-purpose grants to the provinces.  
 
Frequently Encountered Concerns in Designing Equalization Transfers.  
The most frequently encountered concerns in designing equalization transfers include: 
defining  the equalization standard,  whether or not to include tax efforts provisions, how 
to ensure stability and forestalling strategic behaviors to qualify for higher level of 
transfers.  These issues are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Equalizing net fiscal benefits requires an explicit standard of equalization—the level to 
which each state is entitled to be raised to provide public sector net benefits per 
household that are comparable to other states. Simplicity dictates choosing either the 
mean or the median of the governmental units involved as the standard. The mean 
provides a good representation of the data as long as outliers are not present. If sample 
values have a wide range, the median, or the mean after eliminating outliers, provides a 
better representation of the sample. The mean is preferable to the median, however, for 
ease of computation.  
 
An ideal fiscal equalization program is self-financing. Member governments are assessed, 
as in Germany, positive and negative entitlements that total zero, with the federal 
government acting as a conduit. If an interstate equalization pool creates administrative 
difficulties, the equalization program can be financed out of general federal revenues, as 
done in Canada, derived in part from the states receiving equalization. 
 
There is general consensus in the academic literature that an equalization system should 
enable state governments to provide a standard package of public services if the 
government imposes a standard level of taxes on the bases at its disposal. State   31
governments or their citizens should, however, be permitted to substitute lower rates of 
taxation for lower levels of services. In such cases, the equalization payments should be 
in the form of unconditional grants, which have only income effects. Service areas in 
which there is a good reason to set minimum national standards are better handled by 
output-based conditional grants and shared-cost programs. By raising a state’s fiscal 
capacity, unconditional equalization grants enable poorer states to participate in shared-
cost programs more easily. 
 
Incorporating tax effort into the formula for determining equalization involves making 
the equalization entitlement a function of the ratio of actual tax collections in a state to 
the state’s base. Potential nonrecipient states may wish to see such a factor incorporated 
into the program to prevent states with a positive fiscal deficiency in an area from 
collecting equalization payments even if they may not levy a tax in the area. Potential 
recipient states may wish to see tax effort incorporated because without it, extra tax effort 
on their part will be relatively unproductive compared with a wealthy state.  
 
Several problems exist with incorporating tax effort into the program: 
•  The inclusion of tax effort will cause the program to depart from its unconditional 
nature. A state should be free to substitute grant funds for revenue from own 
sources. 
•  If a state raises taxes to provide a package of services that is more costly than the 
standard, it should not receive equalization for doing so; other states should not 
have to pay most of the cost if a state decides to paint its roads. 
•  Incorporating tax effort ties the federal government to the expenditure 
philosophies of the various states. 
•  Some states do not have tax bases in all areas. 
•  Incorporating tax effort may encourage the employment of strategy by a state. 
•  In view of the different abilities of the states to export taxes, the measurement of 
tax effort would be crude. 
•  Incorporating tax effort could result in an increase in taxes on the poor states. 
 
In view of these considerations, including tax effort would not improve a program of 
equalization payments. 
 
If equalization payments are based on relative measures of fiscal capacity, they should 
have a stabilizing effect on state revenues. The level of payments will move in the 
opposite direction of states’ own revenue-raising capacity. Maximum stabilization of 
state-local revenues will occur when payments are based on all revenue sources, a 
national average standard of equalization is used, cyclical fluctuations in provincial 
economies are small, and the time lag in calculating the grants is relatively short. When 
any large component of the total base, such as natural resource revenues, is volatile, the 
destabilizing effects can be large. In this case, some sort of averaging formula should be 
used to ease difficulties associated with provincial budgeting in the face of uncertainty. 
 
Strategy refers to action provincial/state governments can take to influence the level of 
payments they receive. A program that enables a state to employ strategy is undesirable,   32
because in general the extra payments received may not have any relation to actual 
disparities. For example, a program employing tax effort could enable states to raise their 
entitlements by imposing heavy taxes in areas in which they have a tax base below the 
national average. This problem is less serious in practice than one might expect, since 
room for additional taxation from sources in which the potential have-not states are not 
well endowed is extremely limited. 
 
Reflections on Comparative Practices of Fiscal Equalization Transfers 
A small but growing number of industrial countries and transition economies have 
introduced fiscal equalization programs. These include Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, 
Germany, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Russian Federation, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and Ukraine. All equalization programs are concerned with interjurisdictional 
equity or horizontal fiscal equity, not interpersonal (vertical) equity. Which level of 
government finances and administers an equalization program is determined either by the 
constitution (as in Canada, Germany, and Switzerland) or by the legislature (as in 
Australia) (table 5).    33
Table 5 Features of Fiscal Equalization Transfers in Selected Countries 
 
Feature  Australia Canada  Germany Switzerland 
Objective  Build capacity to 
provide services at 
same standard 
with same revenue 







of public services 
at reasonably 
comparable levels 








of certain public 
services without 
much heavier tax 
burdens in some 
cantons than 
others 
Legal status  Federal law  Constitution  Constitution  Constitution 
Legislation  Federal parliament  Federal parliament  Federal 
parliament, 




Paternal or fraternal  Paternal   Paternal  Fraternal  Mixed 
Total pool 
determination  
Ad hoc  Formula  Formula  Ad hoc 
Equalization 
standard determines 
pool and allocation 
No Yes  Yes  No 




tax system  
Yes, representative 
tax system  
Yes, actual 
revenues 










High Low  Low Medium 
Political consensus   No (?)  Yes (?)  Yes (?)   Yes 




Solidarity Pact II  Federal 
government  
Sunset clause  No  Yes, five years  No  No 
Dispute resolution  Supreme Court  Supreme Court  Constitutional 
Court 
Supreme Court  
Source: Author. 
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Paternal programs, in which higher-level governments finance equalization at lower levels, 
are common (examples include Australia and Canada). Fraternal or Robin Hood–type 
(Robin Hood stole from the rich to give to the poor) programs, in which governments at the 
same level establish a common pool, to which rich jurisdictions contribute and the poor 
jurisdictions draw, are rare (exceptions include Germany at the Länder level and Denmark 
at the local level). Robin Hood programs are preferred, as they represent an open political 
compromise balancing the interests of the union and the contributing jurisdictions, as done 
by the Solidarity Pact II in Germany. Such programs foster national unity, as poorer 
jurisdictions clearly see the contributions made for their well-being by residents of other 
jurisdictions. Paternal programs lack the discipline of fraternal programs, because unless 
enshrined in the constitution (as in Canada), they are guided largely by national politics and 
the budgetary situation of the federal and state/provincial (for local equalization) 
governments.  
 
Some countries combine both Robin Hood (fraternal) and paternal components in their 
grant programs. In Switzerland, effective 2007,  the federal government finances two-thirds 
of the program, with the remaining third financed by the rich cantons. The program has a 
fiscal capacity equalization component based on factor income, with 59 percent of the 
financing from the federal government and 41 percent from rich cantons. The cost 
equalization component is financed solely by the federal government. The German 
equalization program has a small supplementary component financed solely by the federal 
government. In Denmark equalization at the local level uses the Robin Hood approach for 
both fiscal capacity and fiscal need equalization for counties (using 85 percent national 
average standard) and large cities (90 percent and 60 percent of national average standards 
for fiscal capacity and fiscal need respectively ); for smaller municipalities, it uses the 
paternal approach for fiscal capacity equalization (using 50 percent of national average 
standard as the standard of equalization) and the Robin Hood approach for fiscal need 
equalization (using 35 percent of the national average as the standard of equalization).  
 
Fiscal equalization programs also differ in terms of how the total pool of resources devoted 
to such programs is determined. In the Canadian and German programs, both the total pool 
and its allocation to provinces/states are formula driven. Under the Australian and Swiss 
programs, the total pool is arbitrarily determined by the federal government through an act 
of parliament—total proceeds of the general sales tax in Australia and an arbitrarily 
determined level of funding from the federal government and rich cantons in Switzerland.  
 
The method of equalization also differs across programs. Australia, Canada, and Germany 
equalize per capita fiscal capacity using the representative tax system; Switzerland uses 
macro tax bases. It devotes 19 percent of equalization financing to cost equalization using 
eight factors: population size, area, population density, population older than 80, number of 
large cities, number of foreign adults resident for more than 10 years, unemployment, and 
number of people requesting social assistance from the canton. In Germany actual rather 
than potential revenues are used in these calculations, as both actual and potential revenues 
are the same due to the uniformity of state tax bases and tax rates through federal 
legislation. It makes simple expenditure need adjustments based on population size, density   35
and for harbour cities. China uses potential revenues although they equal actual revenues, 
when there is uniformity of tax bases and tax rates as mandated by central government 
legislation there. The Canadian program does not include fiscal need compensation. 
Australia uses a comprehensive equalization program, equalizing fiscal capacity as well as 
need for all state expenditures. Introduction of expenditure needs compensation introduces 
complexity and controversy and dilutes political consensus. As a result, the Australian 
program is the most complex and controversial of all programs and has garnered the least 
political consensus.  
 
Most equalization programs are introduced as permanent programs; an exception is 
Canada, where there is a sunset clause for quinquennial review and renewal by the national 
parliament. Such a clause is helpful in providing a regular periodic evaluation and fine- 
tuning of the system. Almost all programs in mature federations specify formal 
mechanisms for resolving disputes regarding the working of these transfers programs.  
 
Overall, the experience of mature federations with fiscal equalization suggests that in the 
interest of simplicity, transparency, and accountability, it would be better for such 
programs to focus only on fiscal capacity equalization to an explicit standard that 
determines the total pool as well as the allocation among recipient units. Fiscal need 
compensation is best dealt with through specific-purpose transfers for merit goods, as is 
done in most industrial countries.  
  
Most transition economies have equalization components in their grant programs to 
subnational governments. China, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Russian 
Federation, and Ukraine have adopted transfer formulas that explicitly incorporate either 
fiscal capacity and/or expenditure need equalization concerns. For local fiscal equalization, 
these countries nevertheless use one size fits all approaches to diverse forms of local 
government, creating equity concerns.  
 
With the exception of Indonesia, developing countries have not implemented programs 
using explicit equalization standards, although equalization objectives are implicitly 
attempted in the general revenue-sharing mechanisms used in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
India, Nigeria, Mexico, Pakistan, and South Africa. These mechanisms typically combine 
diverse and conflicting objectives into the same formula and fall significantly short on 
individual objectives. Because the formulas lack explicit equalization standards, they fail to 
address regional equity objectives satisfactorily. Even in the Indonesian program total pool 
is not determined by an explicit equalization standard and instead equalization standard is 
implicitly determined by the ad hoc determination of total funds available for equalization 
purposes.  
 
Setting National Minimum Standards 
Setting national minimum standards in regional-local services may be important for two 
reasons. First, there is an advantage to the nation as a whole from such standards, which 
contribute to the free flow of goods, services, labor, and capital; reduce wasteful 
interjurisdictional expenditure competition; and improve the gains from trade from the 
internal common market. Second, these standards serve national equity objectives. Many   36
public services provided at the subnational level, such as education, health, and social 
welfare, are redistributive in their intent, providing in-kind redistribution to residents. In a 
federal system, lower-level provision of such services—while desirable for efficiency, 
preference matching, and accountability—creates difficulty fulfilling federal equity 
objectives. Factor mobility and tax competition create strong incentives for lower-level 
governments to underprovide such services and to restrict access to those most in need, 
such as the poor and the old. Attempts to exclude those most in need are justified by their 
greater susceptibility to disease and potentially greater risks for cost curtailment. Such 
perverse incentives can be alleviated by conditional nonmatching grants, in which the 
conditions reflect national efficiency and equity concerns and there is a financial penalty 
associated with failure to comply with any of the conditions. Conditions are thus imposed 
not on the specific use of grant funds but on attainment of standards in quality, access, and 
level of services. Such output-based grants do not affect local government incentives for 
cost efficiency, but they do encourage compliance with nationally specified standards for 
access and level of services. Properly designed conditional nonmatching output-based 
transfers can create incentives for innovative and competitive approaches to improved 
service delivery. Input-based grants fail to create such an accountability environment.  
 
With a few exceptions, noted below, both industrial and developing countries typically do 
not use output-based transfers for fiscal need compensation in sectoral grants. However, 
industrial countries typically keep the design of input-based conditional sectoral grants 
simple, using relatively simple demographic factors. In contrast, developing countries opt 
for complex formulas, using state of the art quantitative techniques (table 6). 
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Table 6 Need Factors Used for Grant Financing of Health Care in Selected Countries 
 
Country name  Need Factors for Health Care Grants 
(a) Need based top-up for health care in general grants 
Belgium  Age, gender, unemployment, disability 
Finland (to local governments)  Age, disability, remoteness, local tax base 
Germany Age,  gender 
Netherlands  Age, gender, urbanization, income base 
Switzerland  Age, gender, region, income 
(b) Need-based specific purpose transfers for core health services 
Denmark  Age, children of single parents 
England  Age, sex, mortality, unemployment, elderly living alone 
France Age 
Italy (two-thirds)  Age, gender, mortality 
Northern Ireland  Age, gender, mortality, low birth weight 
Norway (50 percent)  Age, gender, mortality, elderly living alone 
Portugal (15 percent)  Burden of illness: diabetes, hypertension, AIDS, tuberculosis 
Scotland  Age, gender, mortality, rural costs 
Spain Cross-boundary  flows 
Sweden  Age, living alone, employment status, housing 
Wales  Age, gender, mortality, rural costs 
(c) Health transfers using composite indexes based upon principal component analysis  
Brazil  Infant mortality, 1–64 mortality, 65+ mortality, mortality rate by 
infectious and parasitic diseases, mortality rate for neoplasia, 
mortality rate for cardiovascular conditions, adolescent mother 
percentage, illiteracy percentage, percentage of homes without 
sanitation, percentage of homes without running water, 
percentage of homes without garbage collection. 
South Africa  Percentage female; percentage children under 5; percentage 
living in rural area; percentage older than 25 without schooling; 
percentage unemployed; percentage living in traditional 
dwelling, shack or tent; percentage without piped water in house 
or on site; percentage without access to refuse disposal; 
percentage without access to phone; percentage without access to 
electricity; percentage living in household headed by a woman. 
Source: World Bank (2006). 
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A good illustration of a simple but effective output-based grant system is the Canadian 
Health Transfers program by the Federal Government of Canada. The program has enabled 
Canadian provinces to ensure universal access to high-quality health care to all residents 
regardless of their income or place of residence.  
 
Under this program the federal government provides per capita transfers for health to the 
provinces, with the rate of growth of the transfers tied to the rate of growth of GDP. No 
conditions are imposed on spending, but strong conditions are imposed on access to health 
care. As part of the agreement to receive transfers from the federal government, the 
provinces undertake to abide by several access-related conditions:  
1.  Universality: All residents enjoy the same coverage. 
2.  Portability: Residents who move to another province retain health coverage in the 
province of origin for a transition period. Residents and nonresidents have equal 
access. 
3.  Public insurance but public/private provision: The province agrees to provide 
universal insurance to all. Both public and private providers are reimbursed from 
the public insurance system using the same schedule of payments, negotiated by the 
provincial medical association. 
4.  Opting in and opting out: Providers participating in the system cannot bill patients 
directly but are reimbursed by the province. All health care providers can opt out of 
the system, billing patients directly and not following the prescribed fee schedule. 
Patients of these providers are reimbursed according to a government schedule of 
payments by submitting claims. 
5.  No extra billing: Charges in excess of the prescribed schedule are not permitted by 
providers opting in the system.  
 
Breaches in any of these conditions results in penalties. If any of the first four conditions is 
breached, grant funding can be terminated. If the last condition is breached, grant funds are   
reduced on a dollar for dollar basis.  
 
Developing countries and transition economies rarely use conditional nonmatching output-
based transfers to ensure national minimum standards in merit goods or fiscal need 
compensation. There are nevertheless a few shining examples of programs that marry 
equity with performance orientation in grant allocation. These include central government 
transfers to provincial and local governments for primary education and transportation in 
Indonesia (discontinued in 2001); per pupil grants to all schools and a 25 percent additional 
grant as salary bonus for teachers in the best performing schools in Chile (Gonzalez 2005 ) 
and central grants to municipal governments to subsidize water and sewer use by the poor 
in Chile (Gomez-Lobo, 2002), central per capita transfers for education in Colombia and 
South Africa, and federal per pupil grants to states for secondary education and to 
municipalities for primary education in Brazil (Gordon and Vegas 2004).  
 
Indonesian pe-2001 education and road maintenance grants to districts are examples of 
good grant design. The operating grant for schools in Indonesia used school-age population 
(7–12) as the criterion for distributing funds to district and town governments. These   39
operating grants were supplemented by a matching capital grant for school construction 
(local government matching in the form of land for school) to achieve minimum standards 
of access to primary schooling – having primary school within walking distance to each 
community. The grants enabled Indonesia to achieve remarkable success in improving 
literacy and achieving minimum standards of access to primary education across the nation.  
 
The Indonesian District/Town Road Improvement Grant (pre-2001) used length of roads, 
condition, density (traffic use), and unit costs as criteria for distributing funds. This grant 
program helped monitor the health of the road network on a continuing basis and kept 
roads in good working conditions in most jurisdictions (Shah 1998).  
 
In Chile and the State of Michigan in the United States, school grants finance vouchers for 
school-age children, giving parents choice in sending their children to public, private, or 
parochial schools. An additional performance grant of 25 percent is available to the best 
performing schools, for use as salary bonus to teachers in Chile. Grants to municipal 
governments in Chile for water and sewer access by the poor cover 25–85 percent (means 
tested) of a household’s water and sewer bill for up to 15 cubic meters a month, with the 
client paying the rest (Gomez-Lobo 2002).  
 
Brazil has two noteworthy national minimum standards grant programs for primary 
education and health care. Under the 14th amendment to the federal constitution, state and 
municipal governments must contribute 15 percent of their two principal revenue sources 
(state value-added tax and state share of the federal revenue-sharing transfers for states, 
services tax, and the municipal share of the state revenue-sharing transfers for 
municipalities) to the special fund for primary education (FUNDEF). If the sum of the state 
and municipal required contributions divided by the number of primary school students is 
less than the national standard, the federal government makes up the difference. FUNDEF 
funds are distributed among state and municipal providers on the basis of school 
enrollments.  
 
Fiscal transfers in support of Brazil’s Unified Health System, which operationalizes the 
constitutional obligation of the universal right to free health services, are administered 
under a federal program called Annual Budget Ceilings (TGF). The program has two 
components. Under the first component, equal per capita financing from the federal 
government that pass through states to municipalities is provided to cover basic health 
benefits. The second component provides federal financing for hospital and ambulatory 
care and all registered health care providers—state, municipal, and private—are eligible for 
grant financing through their municipal government. Under this grant, funding for hospital 
admissions and high-cost ambulatory care is subject to a ceiling for each type of treatment 
(World Bank, 2001).  
 
Local governments in the Province of Alberta, Canada, use a novel approach to determine 
the allocation of taxpayers’ contribution to school finance. Resident taxpayers designate the 
education component of their property tax bill to either public or parochial (religious, 
private) school boards. These declarations determine the total amount of property tax 
finance available to public and private providers. Schools receive grants on a per pupil   40
basis, and parents retain the option to send their children to a school of their choosing 
regardless of the designation of school board on their tax return. This approach encourages 
competition among schools to attract students and explains better performance of 
government schools in Alberta and several other provinces that use the same approach.  In 
the Province of Ontario, higher education financing assigns weights to enrollments in 
different programs, with medical and engineering education receiving higher weights than 
the humanities.  
 
In conclusion, while output-based (performance-oriented) grants are best suited to grantor’s 
objectives and are simpler to administer than traditional input-based conditional transfers, 
they are rarely practiced. The reasons have to do with the incentives faced by politicians 
and bureaucrats. Such grants empower clients while weakening the sphere for opportunism 
and pork barrel politics. The incentives they create strengthen the accountability of political 
and bureaucratic elites to citizens and weaken their ability to peddle influence and build 
bureaucratic empires. Their focus on value for money exposes corruption, inefficiency, and 
waste. Not surprisingly, this type of grant is blocked by potential losers.  
  
Compensating for Benefit Spillovers 
Compensating for benefit spillovers is the traditional argument for providing matching 
conditional grants. Regional and local governments will not face the proper incentives to 
provide the correct levels of services that yield spillover benefits to residents of other 
jurisdictions. A system of open-ended matching grants based on expenditures giving rise to 
spillovers will provide the incentive to increase expenditures. Because the extent of the 
spillover is usually difficult to measure, the matching rate will be somewhat arbitrary.  
 
Although benefit-cost spillover is a serious factor in a number of countries, such transfers 
have not been implemented in developing countries other than South Africa. South Africa 
provides a closed-ended matching grant to teaching hospitals based on an estimate of 
benefit spillovers associated with enrollment of non-local students and use of hospital 
facilities by nonresidents.  
  
Influencing Local Priorities  
In a federation there is always some degree of conflict among priorities established by 
various levels of government. One way to induce lower-level governments to follow 
priorities established by the higher-level government is for the higher-level government to 
use its spending power by providing matching transfers. The higher-level government can 
provide open-ended matching transfers with a matching rate that varies inversely with the 
recipient’s fiscal capacity. Use of ad hoc grants or open-ended matching transfers is 
inadvisable. Ad hoc grants are unlikely to result in behavioral responses that are consistent 
with the grantor’s objectives. Open-ended grants may create budgetary difficulties for the 
grantor. 
 
India, Malaysia, and Pakistan have conditional closed-ended matching programs. Pakistan 
got into serious difficulty in the late 1990s by offering open-ended matching transfers for 
provincial tax effort. The central government had to abandon this program midstream, after 
it proved unable to meet its obligations under the program.    41
 
Dealing with Infrastructure Deficiencies and Creating Macroeconomic Stability in 
Depressed Regions 
Fiscal transfers can be used to serve central government objectives in regional stabilization. 
Capital grants are appropriate for this purpose, provided funds for future upkeep of 
facilities are available. Capital grants are also justified to deal with infrastructure 
deficiencies in poorer jurisdictions in order to strengthen the common economic union.  
 
Capital grants are typically determined on project by project basis. Indonesia took a 
planning view of such grants in setting a national minimum standard of access to primary 
school (within walking distance of the community served) for the nation as a whole. The 
central government provided for school construction, while local governments provided 
land for the schools.  
South Africa has experimented with a formula-based capital grant to deal with 
infrastructure deficiencies. The Municipal Infrastructure Grant formula includes a 
vertical and horizontal division. The vertical division allocates resources to sectors or 
other priority areas; the horizontal division is determined based on a formula that 
takes account of poverty, backlogs, and municipal powers and functions. The formula 
includes five components: 
•  Basic residential infrastructure, including new infrastructure and 
rehabilitation of existing infrastructure ( 75 percent weight). Proportional 
allocations are made for water supply and sanitation, electricity, roads, and 
“other” (street lighting and solid waste removal). 
•  Public municipal service infrastructure, including construction of new 
infrastructure and rehabilitation of existing infrastructure (15 percent weight). 
•  Social institutions and microenterprises infrastructure (5 percent weight). 
•  Nodal municipalities (5 percent weight). 
•  Final adjustment: A negative (downward adjustment) or positive (top-up) 
allocation related to past performance of each municipality relative to grant 
conditions.  
 
Experience with capital grants shows that they often create facilities that are not 
maintained by subnational governments, which either remain unconvinced of their utility 
or lack the means to provide regular upkeep.  
 
Capital grants are pervasive in developing countries and transition economies. Most 
countries have complex processes for initiating and approving submissions for financing 
capital projects. These processes are highly susceptible to lobbying, political pressure, and 
grantsmanship, and they favor projects that give the central government greater visibility. 
Projects typically lack citizen and stakeholder participation, and they often fail due to lack 
of local ownership, interest, and oversight. In view of these difficulties, it may be best to 
limit the use of capital grants by requiring matching funds from recipients (varying   42
inversely with the fiscal capacity of the recipient unit) and by encouraging private sector 
participation by providing political and policy risk guarantees. To facilitate private sector 
participation, public managers must exercise due diligence to ensure that the private sector 
does not take the public sector for a free ride or walk away from the project midstream. 
  
Special Issues in Transfers from State/Province to Local Governments 
General-purpose transfers to local governments require special considerations, as local 
governments vary in population, size, area served, and type of services offered. In view 
of this, it is advisable to classify local governments by population size, municipality type, 
and urban/rural character, creating separate formulas for each class of municipalities. The 
higher-level government could adopt a representative tax system–based fiscal capacity 
equalization system and set minimum standards grants for each class and type of 
municipality. Where the application of a representative tax system is not feasible due to 
lack of significant tax decentralization or poor local tax administration, a more pragmatic 
but less scientific approach to general-purpose grants could be used. Some useful 
components in these grant formulas are an equal per municipality component, an equal 
per capita component, a service area component, and a fiscal capacity component. Grant 
funds should vary directly with the service area and inversely with fiscal capacity (see 
Shah 1994b on examples of state-local transfers from Australia, Brazil, and Canada). 
South Africa has applied a variant of this approach in central-local transfers (box 3). 
 
Having a formal open, contestable, and deliberative process for municipal incorporation, 
amalgamation, and annexation should be a prerequisite for introducing an equal per 
municipality component in grant finance. The lack of such a process can create a perverse 
incentive for the break-up of existing jurisdictions to qualify for additional assistance, as 
demonstrated by the experience in Brazil (Shah 1991).  
 
Box 3 South Africa’s Equitable Share Formula for Central-Local Fiscal Transfers  
 
South Africa uses an equitable share formula to provide transfers from the central government to 
local governments. The size of the grant is determined as follows:  
  
Grant = (BS + D + I – R) ± C,  
 
where BS is the basic services component, D is the development component, I is the institutional 
support component, R is the revenue-raising capacity correction, and C is a correction and 
stabilization factor. 
 
Basic Services Component 
The purpose of the basic services component is to enable municipalities to provide basic services 
(water, sanitation, electricity , refuse removal, and other basic services), including free basic 
services to households earning less than R800 (about US$111)  a month.
 (As of April 1, 2006, 
environmental health care services have been included as a basic service.) Since by its nature 
environmental health is delivered to everyone in a municipality, this subcomponent is 
calculated on all households, not only poor ones. For each subsidized basic service, there are two 
levels of support: a full subsidy for households that actually receive services from the 
municipality and a partial subsidy for unserviced households, currently set at one-third of the cost 
of the subsidy to serviced households. This component is calculated as follows:   43
 
BS = [water subsidy 1 * poor with water + water subsidy 2 * poor without water] + [sanitation 
subsidy 1 * poor with sanitation + sanitation subsidy 2 * poor without sanitation] + [refuse subsidy 
1 * poor with refuse + refuse subsidy 2 * poor without refuse] +[electricity subsidy 1 * poor with 
electricity + electricity subsidy 2 * poor without electricity] + [environmental healthcare subsidy * 
total number of households]. 
 
Institutional Support Component 
The institutional support component is particularly important for poor municipalities, which are 
often unable to raise sufficient revenue to fund the basic costs of administration and 
governance. Such funding gaps make it impossible for poor municipalities to provide basic 
services to all residents, clients, and businesses. This component supplements the funding of a 
municipality for administrative and governance costs. It does not fully fund all administration 
and governance costs of a municipality, which remain the primary responsibility of each 
municipality. 
 
The institutional component includes two elements: administrative capacity and local electoral 
accountability. The grant is determined as follows:  
 
I = base allocation + [admin support * population] + [council support * number of seats] 
 
where the values used in the formula are I = R350,000 + [R1 * population] + [R36,000 * 
councillors]  
 
The “base allocation” is the amount that goes to every municipal structure (except for a district 
management area). The second term of this formula recognizes that costs rise with population. 
The third term is a contribution to the cost of maintaining councillors for the legislative and 
oversight role. The number of “seats” that will be recognized for purposes of the formula is 
determined by the minister for provincial and local government. 
 
The Development Component 
The development component was set at zero when the current formula was introduced 
on April 1, 2005, pending an investigation of how best to capture the factor in the formula. 
 
The Revenue-Raising Capacity Correction 
The revenue-raising capacity correction raises additional resources to fund the cost of basic 
services and administrative infrastructure. The basic approach is to use the relationship between 
demonstrated revenue-raising capacity by municipalities that report information and objective 
municipal information from Statistics South Africa to proxy revenue-raising capacity for all 
municipalities. The revenue that should be available to a municipality is then “corrected” by 
imposing a “tax” rate of 5 percent. In the case of the Regional Service Councils levy replacement 
grant, the correction is based on the actual grant to each municipality. 
 
Source: South Africa (2006).  
 
4.  Institutional Arrangements for Fiscal Relations  
Who should be responsible for designing the system of federal-state-local fiscal 
relations? There are various alternatives (see Shah, 2005 a for an evaluation framework 
and comparative reflections on alternate institutional arrangements). The first and most 
commonly used practice is for the federal/central government  to decide on it alone  The   44
most obvious one is to make the federal government solely responsible, on the grounds 
that it is responsible for the national objectives that are to be delivered through the fiscal 
arrangements. In many countries, this is the norm and one or more central government 
agencies assume exclusive responsibility for the design and allocation of fiscal transfers. 
A potential problem with this approach is the natural tendency of the federal government 
to be overly involved with state decisionmaking and not to allow the full benefits of 
decentralization to occur. This biases the system toward a centralized outcome, despite 
the fact that the grants are intended to facilitate decentralized decisionmaking. To some 
extent, this problem can be overcome by imposing constitutional restrictions on the 
ability of the federal government to override state and local decisions. In China, central 
government agencies assume sole responsibility without having any legislative checks 
(Shah and Shen, 2006).  In India the federal government is solely responsible for 
Planning Commission transfers and centrally sponsored schemes. These transfers have 
strong input conditionality with potential to undermine state and local autonomy. The 
1988 Brazilian constitution provides strong safeguards against federal intrusion by 
enshrining the transfers’ formula factors in the constitution. These safeguards represent 
an extreme step, as they undermine the flexibility of fiscal arrangements to respond to 
changing economic circumstances.  
 
Alternatively, a separate body could be involved in the design and ongoing reform and 
enforcement of fiscal arrangements. This could be an impartial body or a body made up 
of both federal and state representatives. It could have true decisionmaking authority or 
be purely advisory. Whatever body is responsible, to be effective, it needs to be able to 
coordinate decisionmaking by the two levels of government. Three commonly practiced 
options are: (a) and idependent grants commission; (b) intergovernmental forum; and (c) 
intergovernmental-cum-civil-society forum. 
  
Some countries set up a quasi-independent body, such as a grants commission, to design 
and reform the fiscal system. Such commissions can have a permanent presence, as in 
Australia or South Africa, or they can be brought into existence periodically to make 
recommendations for the next five years, as in India. India has also instituted independent 
grants commissions at the state level as advisory bodies for state-local fiscal transfers.  
These commissions have proven ineffective in some countries, largely because many of 
their recommendations have been ignored by the government and not implemented, as in 
South Africa. In other cases the government may have accepted and implemented the 
commission’s recommendations but been ineffective in reforming the system due to self-
imposed constraints, as in India. In some cases these commissions become too rigorous 
and academic in their approaches, contributing to the creation of an overly complex 
system of intergovernmental transfers. This has been the case with the Commonwealth 
Grants Commission in Australia.  
 
A few countries use intergovernmental forums or executive federalism or federal-
provincial committees to negotiate the terms of the system, as Canada and Germany do. 
In Germany this system is enhanced by having state governments represented in the 
Bundesrat, the upper house of the parliament. This system allows for explicit political 
input from the jurisdictions involved and attempts to develop a common consensus.   45
Typically such forums opt for simplicity in design to make the system transparent and 
politically acceptable. 
 
Finally, a variant of the above is to use an intergovernmental cum legislative cum civil 
society committee with equal representation from all constituent units, chaired by the 
federal government to negotiate changes in existing federal-provincial fiscal 
arrangements. The Finance Commission in Pakistan is an example of this model, which is 
constituted periodically to determine allocations for the next five years.. Pakistan also 
follows the same approach by having province level finance commissions for designing 
and allocating provincial-local fiscal transfers. This approach has the advantage that all 
stakeholders—donors, recipients, civil society, and experts—are represented on the 
commission. Such an approach keeps the system simple and transparent. An important 
disadvantage of this approach is that due to the unanimity rule, such bodies may be 
permanently deadlocked, as has recently been witnessed at the federal level in Pakistan.  
 
5. Lessons from International Practices  
Review of international practices yields a set of practices to avoid and a set of practices to 
emulate. A number of important lessons also emerge (table 7).    46
 
Table 7 Principles and Better Practices in Grant Design 
Grant objective  Grant design  Examples of better 
practices 
Examples of 







Tax abatement and 
tax-base sharing 
(Canada) 
Deficit grants, wage 
grants (China), tax by 








with explicit standard 
that determines total 





sharing with multiple 
factors (Brazil and 
India); fiscal 
equalization with a 






transfers with matching 
rate consistent with spill-
out of benefits 







transfers with conditions 















. Health transfers 
(Brazil, Canada), 
Conditional transfers 
with conditions on 
spending alone (most 
countries), pork 
barrel transfers ( 
USA e.g. $200 
million earmark in 
2006 for a “bridge to 
nowhere” in Alaska), 







Conditional capital grants 
with matching rate that 
varies inversely with local 
fiscal capacity. 





grants to states (United 
States) 
Capital grants with 





areas of high 
national but low 
local priority 
Open-ended matching 
transfers (preferably with 
matching rate varying 
inversely with fiscal 
capacity) 
Matching transfers for 
social assistance 
(Canada before 2004) 






Capital grants, provided 
maintenance possible.  
Capital grants with 
matching rates that 
vary inversely with 
local fiscal capacity 
Stabilization grants 
with no future upkeep 
requirements 
Source: Author.   47
 
 
Negative Lessons: Types of Transfers to Avoid 
Policymakers should avoid designing the following types of intergovernmental grants: 
1.  Grants with vaguely specified objectives.  
2.  General revenue–sharing programs with multiple factors that work at cross 
purposes, and undermine accountability and do not advance fiscal efficiency or 
fiscal equity objectives. Tax decentralization or tax-base sharing offer better 
alternatives to a general revenue– sharing program, as they enhance 
accountability while preserving subnational autonomy.  
3.  Grants to finance subnational deficits, which create incentives for running higher 
deficits in future. 
4.  Unconditional grants that include incentives for fiscal effort . Improving service 
delivery while lowering tax costs should be public sector objectives.  
5.  Input- (or process-) based or ad hoc conditional grant programs, which undermine 
local autonomy, flexibility, fiscal efficiency, and fiscal equity objectives.  
6.  Capital grants without assurance of funds for future upkeep, which have the 
potential to create white elephants.  
7.  Negotiated or discretionary grants in a federal system, which may create 
dissention and disunity. 
8.  One size fits all grants to local governments, which create huge inequities. 
9.  Grants that involve abrupt changes in the total pool and its allocation.  
 
Positive Lessons: Principles to Adopt 
Policymakers should strive to respect the following principles in designing and 
implementing intergovernmental transfers: 
1.  Keep it simple. In the design of fiscal transfers, rough justice may be better than 
full justice, if it achieves wider acceptability and sustainability. 
2.  Focus on a single objective in a grant program and make the design consistent 
with that objective. Setting multiple objectives in a single grant program runs the 
risk of failing to achieve any of them.  
3.  Introduce ceilings linked with macro indicators and floors, to ensure stability and 
predictability in grant funds. 
4.  Introduce sunset clauses. It is desirable to have the grant program reviewed 
periodically—say, every five years—and renewed (if appropriate). In the 
intervening years, no changes to the program should be made, in order to provide 
certainty in budgetary programming for all governments.  
5.  Equalize per capita fiscal capacity to a specified standard in order to achieve 
fiscal equalization. Such a standard would determine the total pool and allocations 
among recipient units. Calculations required for fiscal capacity equalization using 
a representative tax system for major tax bases are doable for most countries. In 
contrast, expenditure need equalization requires difficult and complex analysis, 
inviting much controversy and debate; as desirable as it is, it may not therefore be 
worth doing. In view of this practical difficulty, it would be best to deal with 
fiscal need equalization through output-based sectoral grants that also enhance 
results-based accountability. A national consensus on the standard of equalization   48
is critically important for the sustainability of any equalization program. The 
equalization program must not be looked at in isolation from the broader fiscal 
system, especially conditional transfers. The equalization program must have a 
sunset clause and provision for formal review and renewal. For local fiscal 
equalization, one size does not fit all.  
6.  In specific-purpose grant programs, impose conditionality on outputs or standards 
of access and quality of services rather than on inputs and processes. This allows 
grantors to achieve their objectives without undermining local choices on how 
best to deliver such services. Most countries need to establish national minimum 
standards of basic services across the nation in order to strengthen the internal 
common market and economic union.  
7.  Recognize population size class, area served, and the urban/rural nature of 
services in making grants to local governments. Establish separate formula 
allocations for each type of municipal or local government. 
8.  Establish hold harmless or grandfathering provisions that ensure that all recipient 
governments receive at least what they received as general-purpose transfers in 
the pre-reform period. Over time, as the economy grows, such a provision would 
not delay the phase-in of the full package of reforms.  
9.  Make sure that all stakeholders are heard and that an appropriate political compact 
on equalization principles and the standard of equalization is struck. Politics must 
be internalized in these institutional arrangements. Arms-length institutions, such 
as independent grant commissions, are not helpful, as they do not allow for 
political input and therefore tend to opt for complex and nontransparent solutions.  
 
Moving from a public sector governance culture of dividing the spoils to an environment 
that enables responsive, responsible, equitable and accountable governance is critical. 
Doing so requires exploring all feasible tax decentralization options, instituting output-
based operating and capital fiscal transfers, establishing a formal fiscal equalization 
program with an explicit standard of equalization, and ensuring responsible access to 
borrowing.    49
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